# Primary Sources on Copyright - Record Viewer
Kant: On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting, Berlin (1785)

Source: Retrospektive Digitalisierung wissenschaftlicher Rezensionsorgane und Literaturzeitschriften des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts aus dem deutschen Sprachraum, http://www.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/diglib/aufklaerung/index.htm.

Citation:
Kant: On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting, Berlin (1785), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org

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            Chapter 1 Page 14 of 15 total




(416)


and can say of himself no more than that the author is delivering the
following 'speech' through him (Impensis Bibliopolae)*. For it is
a contradiction to give a speech in one's own name which according to the
announcement one has made oneself, and as expected by the public, is
supposed to be the speech of someone else. The reason, therefore, why all
works of art by other persons may be copied for public sale, whereas books
which already have their appointed publishers may not be reprinted, lies
in the fact that the former are works (opera), whilst the latter
are acts (operae), so that those are things which exist in
themselves, whereas these can have their existence only in a person.
Consequently, the latter belong exclusively to the person of the author**,
and he

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* Lat. "At the expense of the book publisher".

** The author and the owner of a copy can both say with equal right of the
copy: it is my book! - but in different senses. The former is regarding
the book as a written work or speech, whereas the latter sees in it simply
the mute instrument for the delivery of the speech to him, or to the public -
i.e. he regards it as a copy. This right of the author is, however, not a
right to the object, that is, to the copy (for its owner is certainly entitled
to, say, burn it in front of the author); rather, it is an innate right,
invested in his own person, entitling him to prevent anyone else from
presenting him as speaking to the public without his consent - a consent
which cannot be taken for granted by any means, since he has already conceded
it to someone [to his publisher].


    



( 416 )


und von sich nichts weiter sagen, als daß
der Verfasser durch ihn (Impensis Bibliopolae)
folgende Rede ans Publicum halte. Denn es ist
ein Widerspruch: eine Rede in seinem Namen zu
halten, die doch nach seiner eigenen Anzeige
und gemäß der Nachfrage des Publicums die
Rede eines andern sein soll. Der Grund also,
warum alle Kunstwerke anderer zum öffentlichen
Vertrieb nachgemacht, Bücher aber, die schon
ihre eingesetzte Verleger haben, nicht
nachgedruckt werden dürfen, liegt darin: daß
die erstern Werke (opera), die zweiten Handlungen
(operae) sind, davon jene als für sich selbst
existirende Dinge, diese aber nur in einer
Person ihr Dasein haben können. Folglich
kommen diese letztern der Person des Verfassers
ausschließlich zu; *) und derselbe


_____________________

*) Der Autor und der Eigenthümer des Exemplars
können beide mit gleichem Rechte von demselben
sagen: es ist mein Buch! aber in verschiedenem
Sinne. Der erstere nimmt das Buch als Schrift
oder Rede; der zweite bloß als das stumme
Instrument der Überbringung der Rede an ihn
oder das Publicum, d. i. als Exemplar. Dieses
Recht des Verfassers ist aber kein Recht in
der Sache, nämlich dem Exemplar (denn der
Eigenthümer kann es vor des Verfassers Augen
verbrennen), sondern ein angebornes Recht in
seiner eignen Person, nämlich zu verhindern,
daß ein anderer ihn nicht ohne seine
Einwilligung zum Publicum reden lasse, welche
Einwilligung gar nicht präsumirt werden kann,
weil er sie schon einem andern ausschließlich
ertheilt hat.

    

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