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Hegel: Remarks on Intellectual Property, Berlin (1821)
Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz Libr.impr.c.n.mss.oct.126
Citation:
Hegel: Remarks on Intellectual Property, Berlin (1821), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
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48
of what is substantive, i.e. that whose determinate character
lies in its pure externality. From the point of view of free
mind, which must, of course, be distinguished from mere
consciousness, the external is external absolutely, and it is
for this reason that the determinate character assigned to
nature by the concept is inherent externality.
§ 43
As the concept in its immediacy, and so as in essence a
unit, a person has a natural existence partly within himself
and partly of such a kind that he is related to it as to an
external world. It is only these things in their immediacy as
things, not what they are capable of becoming through the
mediation of the will, i.e. things with determinate characteristics,
which are in question here where the topic under discussion
is personality, itself at this point still in its most
elementary immediacy.
Mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even things
ecclesiastical (like sermons, masses, prayers, consecration of
votive objects), inventions, and so forth, become subjects of a
contract, brought on to a parity, through being bought and sold,
with things recognised as things. It may be asked whether the
artist, scholar, &c., is from the legal point of view in
possession of his art, erudition, ability to preach a sermon,
sing a mass, &c., that is, whether such attainments are 'things'.
We may hesitate to call such abilities, attainments, aptitudes, &c.,
'things', for while possession of these may be the subject of
business dealings and contracts, as if they were things, there is
also something inward and mental about it, and for this reason
the Understanding may be in perplexity about how to describe such
possession in legal terms, because its field of vision is as
limited to the dilemma that this is 'either a thing or not a thing'
No Transcription available.
Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz Libr.impr.c.n.mss.oct.126
Citation:
Hegel: Remarks on Intellectual Property, Berlin (1821), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
Back | Record | Images | Commentaries: [1]
Translation only | Transcription only | Show all | Bundled images as pdf
of what is substantive, i.e. that whose determinate character
lies in its pure externality. From the point of view of free
mind, which must, of course, be distinguished from mere
consciousness, the external is external absolutely, and it is
for this reason that the determinate character assigned to
nature by the concept is inherent externality.
As the concept in its immediacy, and so as in essence a
unit, a person has a natural existence partly within himself
and partly of such a kind that he is related to it as to an
external world. It is only these things in their immediacy as
things, not what they are capable of becoming through the
mediation of the will, i.e. things with determinate characteristics,
which are in question here where the topic under discussion
is personality, itself at this point still in its most
elementary immediacy.
Mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even things
ecclesiastical (like sermons, masses, prayers, consecration of
votive objects), inventions, and so forth, become subjects of a
contract, brought on to a parity, through being bought and sold,
with things recognised as things. It may be asked whether the
artist, scholar, &c., is from the legal point of view in
possession of his art, erudition, ability to preach a sermon,
sing a mass, &c., that is, whether such attainments are 'things'.
We may hesitate to call such abilities, attainments, aptitudes, &c.,
'things', for while possession of these may be the subject of
business dealings and contracts, as if they were things, there is
also something inward and mental about it, and for this reason
the Understanding may be in perplexity about how to describe such
possession in legal terms, because its field of vision is as
limited to the dilemma that this is 'either a thing or not a thing'
No Transcription available.