25
porque
none had come forward
promptly to ask for the extension of their privilege a year after
the previous one expired, according to what was stipulated in law
26 of tit. 16.
Based on the principle that the law gives every living inheritor
the ownership of works for ten years as from the date of its promulgation,
it would follow that whoever had enjoyed it for twenty years before
could enjoy it for
thirty and only the author’s inheritors
could have it for
only ten if the author had died the day before;
which contradicts the spirit and text of the law which establishes that it
cannot overrun more than ten years, and that these years are consecutive
to the author’s death. It would also follow that rights would resurrect after
they expired, and that some particular books would again be privately owned,
which had already become communally owned because the inheritors’ rights
had expired. In my opinion, this would be absurd.
Mr. Escriche adds that such an application would be
barbaric, because it would unexpectedly ruin inheritors who, trusting the law, had made editions that could not be sold because of booksellers who would make other more cheaper editions. Mr. Escriche does not consider a law
barbaric for shortening
and restricting to a certain number of years an indefinite time that authors
and their inheritors had for printing and exclusively selling their works
as far as the specified term begins from the promulgation; and it favours it
with such a soft epithet, when he puts together a publication that the heirs made
(and not the author, who continues to own it throughout his lifetime)
with the one that the speculators could publish in the exceptional event
that quick sale of the work would provide an outlet for many simultaneous
editions. However, that could cause serious damage in certain
circumstances, and it would only force the inheritor to lower a bit the price
of his edition, but never less than the cost; and he would
always be given time for being the only seller as it was assumed
25
virtud de las leyes anteriores, porque
ninguno habia acudido pun-
tualmente á pedir la próroga de su privilegio al año de haberse
estinguido el anterior, segun el mandato espreso de la lei 26 del
tit. 16.
Del principio de suponer que la lei da á todos los herederos que
viven, la propiedad de las obras por diez años que han de contar-
se desde su promulgacion, se seguiría tenerla
treinta años los que
la hubiesen disfrutado ántes veinte, y tenerla
solo diez los herede-
ros del autor que hubiese muerto la víspera; lo cual desdice del
espíritu y letra de la lei, que establece que no ha de durar mas
que diez años, y que estos sean los consecutivas á la muerte del au-
tor. Seguiriáse tambien que resucitarian derechos tiempo há muer-
tos, y que volverian á ser de propiedad particular algunas libros,
que habian ya pasado á la comun, por haber caducado el derecho
de los herederos; lo que es á mi modo de ver un absurdo.
Añade el Sr. Escriche que semejante aplicacion seria
bárbara, porque podría causar improvisamente la ruina de los herederos que confiados en la lei hubiesen hecho ediciones, que se quedasen sin des- pacho por la libre concurrencia de los libreros que harian otras mas económicas. El Sr. Escriche no juzga
bárbara una lei que abrevie y
restrinja á cierto número de años el tiempo indefinido, que en su
sentir tenían los autores y sus herederos para la impresión y venta
exclusiva de sus obras, con tal que el término designado se em-
pieze a contar desde la promulgacion; y la favorece con tan suave
epíteto, cuando pone en concurrencia una impresion hecha por los
herederos (y no por el autor, que sigue siendo propietario duran-
te su vida) con las que podrian publicar los especuladores en el
caso, raro ciertamente, de que la rápida venta de la obra ofrezca
salida á muchas ediciones simultáneas. No obstante, aquello puede
ocasionar perjuicios de grave consecuencia en ciertas circunstan-
cias, y lo último solamente obligaria al heredero á bajar algo el
precio de su edicion, pero nunca á perder el coste; y simpre le
concedia un tiempo para ser el único vendedor, por suponerse que