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Morillot on the author's right, Paris (1878)
Source: Bibliothèque universitaire de Poitiers (SCD) : Revue critique de législation et de jurisprudence, XXVIIe année, nouvelle série, tome VII
Citation:
Morillot on the author's right, Paris (1878), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
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135
duration to the draughtsman, to the industrial modeller, to the inventor,
writer, musician and artist.
Finally, it is relative in terms of its object, since the prohibition
does not and could never extend to all the forms of reproduction to which
a work might be subject, but only to certain of those forms, and
especially to lucrative, total and slavish reproductions.
Who can deny that the relative character of this right forbids us
from considering it a natural right? Such a right would necessarily be
absolute: firstly in its nature, since it would be perpetual and non-perishable;
in terms of its subject, since it would be exercised by all authors with the
same fullness; and finally in terms of its object, since it would apply to
all the reproductions to which a work might be subjected. It would be absurd
to talk of a natural, exclusive right of reproduction, which would be doomed
to expire or change its form after a certain number of years, which would
belong fully to certain authors and only partially to certain others, and
whose only effect would be to forbid certain kinds of reproduction among all
those to which the work might be subjected.
And yet this relative character is entirely indelible. Even if we were
to allow that, in the near or distant future, this right were to become fully
perpetual, it is still certain that it could never be exercised in identical
conditions by all authors, nor could it be applied to all the possible forms
of assimilation to which the work might be subjected. Finally, even if we
were to set aside the unlikelihood of this event and imagine for a moment that
the right should become absolute in terms of its subject, it is clear that it
could never be so in terms of its object, since there exists an entire range
of reproductions which, by the very nature of things, not to mention the will
of the author, must necessarily be considered legitimate. The eternally
relative character of the object of this right is on its own sufficient to
demonstrate that that right is not a natural right. One cannot imagine a
natural right of reproduction belonging to the author whose only effect would
be to forbid certain lucrative reproductions, which may be very important in
pecuniary terms, but which are ultimately nothing when compared with all the
kinds of reproduction to which the work is subject. If the author had
No Transcription available.
Source: Bibliothèque universitaire de Poitiers (SCD) : Revue critique de législation et de jurisprudence, XXVIIe année, nouvelle série, tome VII
Citation:
Morillot on the author's right, Paris (1878), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
Back | Record | Images | No Commentaries
Translation only | Transcription only | Show all | Bundled images as pdf
duration to the draughtsman, to the industrial modeller, to the inventor,
writer, musician and artist.
Finally, it is relative in terms of its object, since the prohibition
does not and could never extend to all the forms of reproduction to which
a work might be subject, but only to certain of those forms, and
especially to lucrative, total and slavish reproductions.
Who can deny that the relative character of this right forbids us
from considering it a natural right? Such a right would necessarily be
absolute: firstly in its nature, since it would be perpetual and non-perishable;
in terms of its subject, since it would be exercised by all authors with the
same fullness; and finally in terms of its object, since it would apply to
all the reproductions to which a work might be subjected. It would be absurd
to talk of a natural, exclusive right of reproduction, which would be doomed
to expire or change its form after a certain number of years, which would
belong fully to certain authors and only partially to certain others, and
whose only effect would be to forbid certain kinds of reproduction among all
those to which the work might be subjected.
And yet this relative character is entirely indelible. Even if we were
to allow that, in the near or distant future, this right were to become fully
perpetual, it is still certain that it could never be exercised in identical
conditions by all authors, nor could it be applied to all the possible forms
of assimilation to which the work might be subjected. Finally, even if we
were to set aside the unlikelihood of this event and imagine for a moment that
the right should become absolute in terms of its subject, it is clear that it
could never be so in terms of its object, since there exists an entire range
of reproductions which, by the very nature of things, not to mention the will
of the author, must necessarily be considered legitimate. The eternally
relative character of the object of this right is on its own sufficient to
demonstrate that that right is not a natural right. One cannot imagine a
natural right of reproduction belonging to the author whose only effect would
be to forbid certain lucrative reproductions, which may be very important in
pecuniary terms, but which are ultimately nothing when compared with all the
kinds of reproduction to which the work is subject. If the author had
No Transcription available.