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Morillot on the author's right, Paris (1878)
Source: Bibliothèque universitaire de Poitiers (SCD) : Revue critique de législation et de jurisprudence, XXVIIe année, nouvelle série, tome VII
Citation:
Morillot on the author's right, Paris (1878), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
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136
a natural and exclusive right of reproduction, that right would be absolute,
and would be infringed by any third-party reproduction, even if that
reproduction could not produce a profit, were partial, or even disguised.
For slavish and total reproduction, which deprives the author a material
gain, may well inflict more serious injury to his right: but it is identical
to the other forms, in that, like them, it violates the author’s right, if
that right belongs to him naturally. It is not possible to distinguish
between violations of the law, and one injustice is worth another.
If, then, the very nature of things prevents us from considering that
this right is absolute in terms of its object, it must be concluded that we
are not dealing with a natural right of the first order, but with a simple
and equitable concession granted by positive law. The irregularities,
variations and restrictions which this right exhibits in terms of its nature,
its subject, and its object, the relative and contingent characteristics
with which it is indelibly imbued, prove that this is not a positive right.
It would be just as impossible to explain these characteristics as the result
of the successive spoliations of the positive law, claiming that the law had
taken an originally absolute right and left hardly any of it standing, as
it would be to attribute them to the explicit renunciation or tacit consent
of authors. There is no historical trace of such things. The hypothesis of a
legal spoliation goes against the clearly favourable character of the various
laws which constitute the right of authorship, and the idea of a tacit
renunciation by authors of the right to prevent reproductions which do not
cause them pecuniary damage is contradicted by the fact that many
reproductions which do have that effect remain permitted. Are we really to
believe, furthermore, that the inventor, for example, tacitly consents to
exercise a potentially indefinite and lucrative natural right of reproduction
for a period of fifteen years only?
From all of the above, we must conlude that the exclusive right of the
author may only be considered a privilege granted by positive legislation.
André MORILLOT
No Transcription available.
Source: Bibliothèque universitaire de Poitiers (SCD) : Revue critique de législation et de jurisprudence, XXVIIe année, nouvelle série, tome VII
Citation:
Morillot on the author's right, Paris (1878), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
Back | Record | Images | No Commentaries
Translation only | Transcription only | Show all | Bundled images as pdf
a natural and exclusive right of reproduction, that right would be absolute,
and would be infringed by any third-party reproduction, even if that
reproduction could not produce a profit, were partial, or even disguised.
For slavish and total reproduction, which deprives the author a material
gain, may well inflict more serious injury to his right: but it is identical
to the other forms, in that, like them, it violates the author’s right, if
that right belongs to him naturally. It is not possible to distinguish
between violations of the law, and one injustice is worth another.
If, then, the very nature of things prevents us from considering that
this right is absolute in terms of its object, it must be concluded that we
are not dealing with a natural right of the first order, but with a simple
and equitable concession granted by positive law. The irregularities,
variations and restrictions which this right exhibits in terms of its nature,
its subject, and its object, the relative and contingent characteristics
with which it is indelibly imbued, prove that this is not a positive right.
It would be just as impossible to explain these characteristics as the result
of the successive spoliations of the positive law, claiming that the law had
taken an originally absolute right and left hardly any of it standing, as
it would be to attribute them to the explicit renunciation or tacit consent
of authors. There is no historical trace of such things. The hypothesis of a
legal spoliation goes against the clearly favourable character of the various
laws which constitute the right of authorship, and the idea of a tacit
renunciation by authors of the right to prevent reproductions which do not
cause them pecuniary damage is contradicted by the fact that many
reproductions which do have that effect remain permitted. Are we really to
believe, furthermore, that the inventor, for example, tacitly consents to
exercise a potentially indefinite and lucrative natural right of reproduction
for a period of fifteen years only?
From all of the above, we must conlude that the exclusive right of the
author may only be considered a privilege granted by positive legislation.
André MORILLOT
No Transcription available.